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Why programme governance fails at scale, and how to fix it

Programme Governance Practice2 min read

Programme governance looks straightforward on paper and turns out to be one of the harder disciplines to do well at scale. A small project with one sponsor, one delivery team, and a clear set of success criteria can usually be steered with a RACI matrix and a monthly meeting. The same machinery, applied to a portfolio of interrelated workstreams running across multiple agencies for several years, tends to break in characteristic ways. The published record on large programmes is unkind. McKinsey's 2012 study with the University of Oxford BT Centre for Major Programme Management, covering 5,400 large IT programmes, found average overruns of 45% on cost and 7% on time, with 56% less value delivered than predicted [12]. PMI's 2017 Pulse of the Profession estimated $97 million wasted per $1 billion invested [11]. Flyvbjerg's peer-reviewed work on infrastructure programmes finds the cost-overrun distribution is fat-tailed, not normal, which is another way of saying that very bad outcomes are more common than the planning assumptions usually allow for [13].

We tend to see governance frameworks struggle once budgets cross programme-scale thresholds, typically several billion naira or the equivalent in other currencies, and once delivery starts to involve more than one agency. The Nigerian Public Procurement Act builds tiered approval ceilings into the system precisely because procurement at scale becomes politically and operationally fragile above defined cost limits [14]. The point is structural rather than monetary. Once a programme is large enough that no single sponsor can hold the full picture in their head, the framework needs to be different.

The pattern that recurs in the UK National Audit Office's reviews of failed and challenged programmes is the same one we observe across the programmes we work with. The NHS National Programme for IT, originally costed at £6.4 billion, was the textbook case: an attempt to run a national portfolio of trust-level deployments through a single-sponsor governance model that had not been designed for it [1]. Universal Credit's early phase showed weak management oversight and ambiguous decision rights, which the NAO documented in 2013 [2]. Crossrail's December 2018 delay came after a long period in which the central programme view and the project-level reality had drifted apart, and the assurance reporting between Crossrail Ltd and its sponsors did not catch the gap [3]. HS2's 2024 lessons-learned review pointed in similar directions: weak interdependency management between phases and unclear accountability for portfolio-level scope decisions [5]. None of this is unique to the UK. The patterns travel.

The structural fixes are also well documented. The Management of Portfolios framework from AXELOS separates the portfolio definition cycle from the portfolio delivery cycle and treats them as different governance objects with different cadences and different decision-making bodies [8]. Managing Successful Programmes, fifth edition, embeds the Senior Responsible Owner role, the Programme Board, and the Programme Management Office as distinct entities with explicit accountabilities [9]. The Praxis Framework brings project, programme, and portfolio governance into one open-source body of knowledge and is freely available to organisations that cannot afford the AXELOS license model [10]. The UK Infrastructure and Projects Authority's "Principles for Project Success" codifies the SRO accountability model and integrated assurance for the Government Major Projects Portfolio, which currently runs into the hundreds of billions in whole-life cost [6][7].

Four practical patterns hold up across these frameworks and the case record. First, separate portfolio governance from project governance. Portfolio governance handles strategic alignment, resource allocation across workstreams, and interdependency management. Project governance handles delivery, risk, and stakeholder engagement within a defined scope. Conflating the two produces the rubber-stamp steering committee that NAO has criticised in several of the cases above.

Second, give the Programme Management Office real authority. Not an administrative function producing status reports. A function with a mandate to halt workstreams that are off track, reallocate resource across projects, and challenge delivery teams on their assumptions. MSP and IPA both describe the PMO this way; in practice it is often the part that gets watered down first when budget is tight [9][6].

Third, tier the decisions. Most steering committees we see in trouble are debating items that should never have reached them. A workable tier structure draws explicit thresholds: project-level decisions below an agreed monetary or risk floor, programme-level decisions in a middle band, and portfolio or board-level decisions above a defined ceiling. The Nigerian Public Procurement Act's escalation ceilings give one ready-made starting point for naira-denominated programmes; equivalent thresholds exist in most jurisdictions [14].

Fourth, treat transparency as a design choice, not a culture aspiration. The IPA publishes red, amber and green delivery confidence ratings on the Government Major Projects Portfolio precisely because the discipline of public reporting changes how programme leaders behave [7]. Dashboards visible to all stakeholders, issues surfaced early, escalation paths that actually work: these are the operating disciplines that the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group repeatedly identifies as separating successful country programmes from failed ones [15].

None of this is hidden knowledge. The frameworks have been public for more than a decade. The case studies are public. What is hard is putting all four patterns in place at once, in an organisation whose existing governance arrangements are usually sticky and politically negotiated. That is the actual work.

Coderex advises governments, public sector agencies, and large enterprises on the operational shape of governance at scale: separating portfolio from project governance, designing PMOs with the authority MSP and IPA describe rather than the administrative function the budget conversation tends to deliver, tiering decision rights so steering committees stop debating items they should not see, and translating transparency from cultural aspiration into design choice.

Expect the next IPA Annual Report on Major Projects to expand the Government Major Projects Portfolio whole-life cost figure into the high hundreds of billions and to flag delivery confidence concerns on a meaningful share of that total. Expect at least one major Nigerian federal programme to publish a public RAG-style delivery confidence dashboard before 2028, drawing on the IPA model and the BPP's tiered ceilings. Expect Flyvbjerg's fat-tail finding to drive at least one peer-reviewed update on AI-enabled project portfolios as that data accumulates through 2026 and 2027.

Methodology note: This article draws on UK National Audit Office reports on the NHS National Programme for IT, Universal Credit, Crossrail, the Queen Elizabeth class carriers, and HS2; the AXELOS MoP and MSP frameworks; the Praxis Framework; UK Infrastructure and Projects Authority guidance; the Project Management Institute Pulse of the Profession; the McKinsey/Oxford BT Centre for Major Programme Management 2012 study; Flyvbjerg et al. peer-reviewed work on cost overruns; the Nigerian Public Procurement Act 2007; and World Bank Independent Evaluation Group methodology. The patterns described reflect what we observe across the programmes we work with, anchored to the published case record. We have not named specific Coderex client engagements in this piece.

References

15 sources, all verified at the time of writing

  1. [1]UK National Audit Office, 2013. Review of the final benefits statement for programmes previously managed under the National Programme for IT in the NHS. National Audit Office (NAO), HC 217 Session 2013-14. https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/review-of-the-final-benefits-statement-for-programmes-previously-managed-under-the-national-programme-for-it-in-the-nhs/.
  2. [2]UK National Audit Office, 2013. Universal Credit: early progress. National Audit Office (NAO), HC 621 Session 2013-14. https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/universal-credit-early-progress-2/.
  3. [3]UK National Audit Office, 2018. Investigation into the rescheduling of Crossrail. National Audit Office (NAO), HC 2056 Session 2017-19. https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/the-completion-and-sale-of-high-speed-1/.
  4. [4]UK National Audit Office, 2020. Carrier Strike: Preparing for deployment. National Audit Office (NAO), HC 374 Session 2019-21. https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/carrier-strike-preparing-for-deployment/.
  5. [5]UK National Audit Office, 2024. Lessons learned: a planning and delivery framework for HS2. National Audit Office (NAO), HC 583 Session 2023-24. https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Lessons-learned-from-Major-Programmes.pdf.
  6. [6]UK Infrastructure and Projects Authority, 2021. Principles for project success. UK Cabinet Office, Infrastructure and Projects Authority. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/principles-for-project-success.
  7. [7]UK Infrastructure and Projects Authority, 2024. Annual Report on Major Projects 2023-24. UK Cabinet Office, Infrastructure and Projects Authority. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/infrastructure-and-projects-authority-annual-report-2024.
  8. [8]AXELOS, 2011. Management of Portfolios (MoP). The Stationery Office (TSO) for AXELOS. https://www.axelos.com/certifications/propath/mop-management-of-portfolios.
  9. [9]AXELOS, 2020. Managing Successful Programmes (MSP), 5th edition. The Stationery Office (TSO) for AXELOS. https://www.axelos.com/certifications/propath/msp-managing-successful-programmes.
  10. [10]Praxis Framework, 2024. Praxis Framework: An Integrated Guide to the Management of Projects, Programmes and Portfolios. Praxis Framework Ltd (registered charity 1188810). https://www.praxisframework.org/.
  11. [11]Project Management Institute, 2017. Pulse of the Profession 2017: Success Rates Rise, Transforming the High Cost of Low Performance. Project Management Institute (PMI). https://www.pmi.org/-/media/pmi/documents/public/pdf/learning/thought-leadership/pulse/pulse-of-the-profession-2017.pdf.
  12. [12]McKinsey & Company et al., 2012. Delivering large-scale IT projects on time, on budget, and on value. McKinsey Digital. https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/delivering-large-scale-it-projects-on-time-on-budget-and-on-value.
  13. [13]Bent Flyvbjerg et al., 2018. Five things you should know about cost overrun. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Volume 118, December 2018, pages 174-190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2018.07.013.
  14. [14]Bureau of Public Procurement, Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2007. Public Procurement Act 2007. Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP), Federal Republic of Nigeria. https://www.bpp.gov.ng/?option=com_joomdoc&path=Public_Procurement_Act_2007.pdf&view=documents.
  15. [15]World Bank, 2017. Independent Evaluation Group: Country Program Evaluation methodology and lessons on programme governance. World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/topic/country-program-evaluations.